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O P I N I O N  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge
 In related appeals arising from the same prosecution and trial, Enrique Saldana 
appeals the District Court’s March 18, 2011 judgment of conviction, and George N. 
Greene, Jr., appeals the District Court’s May 3, 2011 judgment of conviction.  For the 
following reasons, we will affirm the judgments of the District Court. 
:  
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I. 
 On December 4, 2008, officers from the Virgin Islands Police Department (VIPD) 
seized and towed a car, previously rented by Rosemary Sauter, that Richard Motta, a 
subcontractor of Sauter’s realty office, had borrowed and left unattended.  Motta’s black 
notebook and keys were inside the car, as well as a package of white flour that Motta had 
cooked to look like a brick of cocaine.  When Motta and Sauter retrieved the car the 
following day, the items were missing, and Motta was told to call VIPD Lieutenant 
Enrique Saldana about them.  Motta and Saldana spoke twice by phone but the items 
were not returned.  One Louis Roldan subsequently approached Motta and told him that 
the package that the VIPD had seized from the car tested positive for heroin and would be 
turned over to federal authorities unless Motta paid $10,000.   
Background 
Motta explained the situation to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  Under the 
direction of the FBI, Motta made recorded telephone calls to Roldan to inform him that 
he would pay only $5,000.  Motta also tried calling Saldana.  Wearing a recording device, 
Motta met with Roldan and VIPD Sergeant George N. Greene, Jr., to negotiate the details 
of the exchange.  Santana was present at the meeting in a VIPD car but did not actively 
participate.  Motta later met with Greene and Roldan again to exchange $5,000 in cash 
for the assurance that he would not be reported to federal law enforcement.   
On August 4, 2009, the grand jury returned an eleven-count Indictment charging 
Greene, Saldana, and Roldan with various counts, including obstruction of justice, 
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extortion, and conspiracy.1
On December 14, 2009, Saldana, Greene, and Roldan proceeded to a jury trial, 
which ended in a mistrial.  The retrial began on January 25, 2010.  During the trial, the 
District Court rejected Greene’s request for Agent Arthurton’s rough notes and declined 
to strike his testimony.  Greene testified at trial and was asked on cross-examination: 
  That same day, Greene gave a voluntary statement to Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) Special Agent Andrew Arthurton.   
Q:  And by the way, do you have any felony convictions? 
A:  Yes, I do. 
Q:  What are they? 
A:  Last –  
[Greene’s Defense Counsel]:  Objection, Judge.  Objection. 
 
Following a sidebar conference, the District Court instructed the jury “to disregard the 
last answer that the witness gave.”  A short time later, at the request of Greene’s counsel, 
the District Court gave a curative instruction: 
You may recall during the last witness that was examined, there was a reference to 
a conviction.  Just as it is not appropriate for you to consider any possible sentence 
during your deliberation, it is improper for you to consider the testimony 
concerning the conviction.  So you are to disregard that, as I had previously told 
you. 
 
The District Court declined to give Saldana’s proposed jury instructions on the public 
authority defense, finding that no evidence supported giving such a charge.   
                                              
1  On September 17, 2009, the grand jury returned a fifteen-count Superseding 
Indictment, which included two counts against Greene for unlawful possession of 
firearms with obliterated serial numbers, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(k)(5)(A) and 
924(a)(1)(B).  The District Court severed those two counts.  Greene was found guilty by 
a jury on both counts and sentenced to concurrent 30-month terms of imprisonment.  
Greene appealed, and we affirmed the District Court’s judgment of conviction and 
sentence in Appeal No. 10-3267. 
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On January 29, 2010, the jury found Saldana, Greene, and Roldan guilty of Counts 
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.  After holding an evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied 
Saldana’s and Greene’s motions for a new trial, which alleged a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial.   
The District Court sentenced Saldana to 41 months imprisonment and entered a 
Judgment of Conviction on March 18, 2011.  The District Court sentenced Greene to 36 
months imprisonment and entered a Judgment of Conviction on May 3, 2011.  Saldana’s 
appeal was docketed as No. 11-1501, and Greene’s appeal was docketed as No. 11-1557.   
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 48 U.S.C.     
§ 1612.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and 48 
U.S.C.  § 1613. 
Discussion 
A.  Saldana 
1.  Hobbs Act 
Saldana was convicted of extortion under the Hobbs Act, which required the 
government to prove that the defendant obstructed, delayed, or affected commerce by 
extortion and that the defendant acted knowingly and willfully.  See United States v. 
Driggs, 823 F.2d 52, 54 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1951).  Saldana contends that 
there was insufficient evidence of an actual effect on interstate commerce.   
We review de novo the District Court’s denial of a motion for judgment of 
acquittal pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.  United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d  
Cir. 2005).  We “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and 
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must sustain a jury’s verdict if a reasonable jury believing the government’s evidence 
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the government proved all the elements of the 
offenses.”  United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal 
quotations omitted).   
 We find, as the District Court did, that federal jurisdiction existed under the Hobbs 
Act based on the “depletion of assets” theory.  See United States v. Marrero, 299 F.3d 
653, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2002).  There was sufficient evidence introduced at trial from 
which a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that interstate commerce 
was affected, as required for a conviction under the Hobbs Act because the FBI had 
supplied the $5,000 that was to be paid to defendants.  Moreover, although the sham 
narcotics had already been destroyed, that act was not so far in the past as to be an 
inappropriate basis for a Hobbs Act violation.  We conclude, therefore, that the District 
Court properly denied Saldana’s motion for judgment of acquittal. 
2.  Brady Violation 
 Saldana alleges that the government failed to search for possible sources of 
exculpatory information regarding Sauter, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963).  For a Brady claim, we review factual findings for clear error and legal 
conclusions de novo.  United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 969 (3d Cir. 1991).  To 
establish a due process violation under Brady, a defendant must show that: 1) evidence 
was suppressed, 2) the suppressed evidence was favorable to the defense, and 3) the 
suppressed evidence was material either to guilt or to punishment.  United States v. 
Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2005).  The District Court found, and we agree, that 
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Saldana has failed to point to any evidence that the government withheld from him or to 
articulate how such evidence would have resulted in his acquittal.  
  3.  Right to Public Trial 
 Saldana contends that the District Court abused its discretion when it denied his 
motion for a new trial based on exclusion of the public during jury selection.  We review 
the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Joseph, 996 
F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1993).  Our review is plenary when the denial was “based on the 
application of legal precepts.”  Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 370 (3d Cir. 1994).     
 On the basis of testimony introduced at the evidentiary hearing, the District Court 
found that individuals had been excluded from the courtroom by a Court Security Officer 
(CSO) during jury roll call at a time when the judge was not present in the courtroom.  
Moreover, it is not clear whether the closure continued after the judge entered the 
courtroom.  If it did -- and the judge was not aware of any closure – it was for an 
insignificant period.  The District Court concluded that Saldana was not denied his Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial because the alleged closure was neither ordered nor 
directed by the District Court and it did not appear to have occurred during a judicial 
proceeding to which the Sixth Amendment attaches.   
Greene raised an identical claim, based on testimony introduced at the same 
evidentiary hearing, in a prior related appeal.  On appeal of that conviction we affirmed 
the District Court’s ruling that Greene did not suffer harm of constitutional dimension 
when a CSO temporarily prevented his family member from entering the courtroom.  
United States v. Greene, 431 F. App’x 191, 197 (3d Cir. 2011).  We noted there, as we do 
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here, that the partial closure was limited in both duration and scope and occurred 
unbeknownst to the trial judge.  See id. at 196-97.  Again, we hold that the District Court 
properly concluded that Saldana was not denied his right to a public trial.       
  4.  Jury Instructions 
 Saldana argues that the District Court erred in denying his request to give a jury 
instruction on the public authority defense.  Where a party objects to the failure to give a 
particular jury instruction, we review de novo whether the jury instructions stated the 
proper legal standard and review for abuse of discretion the refusal to give a particular 
instruction.  United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 74 (3d Cir. 2008).  A defendant is 
“entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence 
sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.”  Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Isaac, 50 
F.3d 1175, 1180 (3d Cir. 1995).  “It is well settled that there is no error to refuse to 
instruct as counsel wishes if the charge to the jury is correct.”  United States v. Blair, 456 
F.2d 514, 520 (3d Cir. 1972).   
 Public authority, either actual public authority or apparent public authority, is an 
affirmative defense.  See United States v. Pitt, 193 F.3d 751, 755-58 (3d Cir. 1999).  
Saldana testified at trial and denied committing any illegal acts.  Because of this 
evidence, there was no basis for a defense that he was authorized to commit the acts, nor 
was there any evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in Saldana’s favor on a 
public authority defense.  The District Court therefore correctly charged the jury and did 
not abuse its discretion by refusing to give the requested instruction.    
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 B.  Greene 
  1.  Admissibility of Evidence 
Greene contends that the District Court abused its discretion when it admitted into 
evidence summary charts and when it refused to order production of an agent’s rough 
notes.  We review the District Court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.  United 
States v. Williams, 458 F.3d 312, 315 (3d Cir. 2006).  “[A]n evidentiary ruling is to be 
reversed only if arbitrary or irrational.”  Id.   
a. Summary Chart 
  The District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence 
telephone records accompanied by a written certification because they were properly 
authenticated pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) and 902(11).  Moreover, the summary 
chart of those voluminous telephone records was properly admitted pursuant to Fed. R. 
Evid. 1006.  See United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting summary 
evidence is admissible under Rule 1006 if the underlying materials upon which it is based 
are admissible).       
   b. Rough Notes 
 The District Court rejected Greene’s request for Agent Arthurton’s rough notes, 
finding that “absent other circumstances” there was an “insufficient basis” to require their 
production.  Because Greene failed to raise a “colorable claim” that the rough notes 
contained Brady material that had not been included in Agent Arthurton’s report, the 
District Court correctly denied Greene’s request.  See United States v. Ramos, 27 F.3d 65, 
71 (3d Cir. 1994).         
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  2.  Prior Felony Conviction 
 Greene contends that the District Court should have ordered a mistrial sua sponte 
following his testimony that he had a prior felony conviction.  When a defendant objects 
but fails to request a mistrial, we review for plain error.  United States v. Richards, 241 
F.3d 335, 341 (3d Cir. 2001).  Under that standard, the Court may, in its discretion, 
correct an error only if the appellant demonstrates that:  1) there is an error, 2) the error is 
“clear or obvious,” 3) the error “affected the appellant’s substantial rights,” i.e.,. affected 
the outcome of the District Court proceedings, and 4) the error “seriously affects the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  United States v. Marcus, 
130 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2010).   
 Although the fact of Greene’s prior felony conviction should not have been 
elicited, he did not testify regarding its nature.  At the prompt objection and request of 
defense counsel, the District Court immediately instructed the jury to disregard the 
answer and also gave a curative instruction a short time later.  The District Court’s 
actions were an adequate cure for any potential prejudice, especially in light of the 
amount of evidence introduced against Greene at trial.  We conclude, therefore, that the 
error was not plain.         
   III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgments of conviction entered by 
the District Court.  
Conclusion 
